In this article, the author provides a simple characterization of retailer response to manufacturer trade deals in terms of the consumer demand conditions that the retailer faces. Specifically, the author shows conditions on the curvature of consumer demand functions that make it optimal for a profit-maximizing retailer to pass through greater (less) than 100% of the trade deal amount it gets from a manufacturer. Using these conditions, the author demonstrates that whereas the linear and all concave consumer demand functions lead to less than 100% optimal retail passthrough, there exists a subset of convex consumer demand functions tor which a retailer rationally engages in greater than 100% pass-through. This subset contains many commonly used demand functions, such as the constant elasticity demand function, the negative exponential demand function, and many other varying elasticity demand functions.
A Characterization of Retailer Response to Manufacturer Trade Deals
One of tbe main purposes of manufacturer trade promotions is to induce retailers to pass some ofthe Incentives to the consumers so as to increase retail sales. How much of the manufacturer deal is passed on by retailers to consumers ("pass-through*"') determines the ultimate success of a trade promotion and is an important input in manufacturers' trade promotions plans (Blattberg and Neslin 1993) . Therefore, it is not surprising thai prior research on trade promotions has given substantial attention to the construct of retailer passthrough (e.g., Armstrong 1991; Blattberg and Neslin 1990; Chevalier and Curhan 1976; Lai 1990; Lai and Villas-Boas 1998; Neslin, Powell, and Stone 1995; Walters 1989) . The empirical findings from some of these articles suggesi that retailers pass through varying percentages, ranging from 0% to more than 100%, ofthe trade dea! amounts they receive from manufacturers. For example. Chevalier and Curhan (1976) examine 992 manufacturer trade promotions over a period of six months for a large supermarket chain and fmd that the retailer pass-throughs range between 0 and 211%, with a mean of 34.6% if all trade deals are included and 126% if only tbe trade deals with nonzero pass-through are roufih generally is defined as the ratio of retail price reduction to the manufacturer price reduction, or the percentage of trade deal (ha( ss given to the consumers. *Rajeev K, Tyagi is an assistant professor, Graduate School ot" Management. University of California-Irvine (e-mail: rklyagils*uci.edu). The author lhaii)i:.s ihe (wo anonymou.s JMR rtrvjewers and Ru.ss Winer for iheir insightful and constructive suggestions. All remaining errors are the author's. To inleraci with colleagues on .specific articles in this issue, see "Feedback" on the .IMR Web siie at www.ama.org/puhs/jmr.
included. -Walters (1989) studies 202 manufacturer trade deals for a large number of product categories, .such a,s frozen entrees, cake mix and frostings, coffee, pet food, detergent, and so forth, in two supermarket chains. He finds that, though the retailer pass-through was less than 100% for most of the trade deals, it exceeded 100% (or many trade deals.^ Armstrong (1991) studies 605 manufacturer trade promotions for a period of two years for four product categories for a large supermarket chain and finds the retail pass-throughs to range between 0 and more than 200%, with means of 143% for tbe disposable diaper category, 170% for the ground caffeinated coffee category, 267% for the toilel tissue category, and 285% for the canned tuna category. Taken together, these empirical studies demonstrate tbat retailer pass-through takes not only the intuitive value of less than 100%, hut also tbe rather surprising value of greater than 100%.
The purpose of this article is to provide a simple analytical characterization of retailer's pass-through decisions in terms of the consumer demand conditions it faces. Specifically, I show conditions on tbe curvature of consumer demand functions that make it optimal for a profit-maximizing retailer to pass through greater (less) than 100% of its trade deal amount Using these conditions, J demonstrate that whereas the linear and all concave consumer demand functions lead to less than 100% optimal retail pas.s-through, there exists a subset of convex consumer demand functions -Sethuraman and Tellis (1991) use the range of pass-throughs repoded hy Chevalier and Curhan (1976) to pick a value of 60% in a nuriiencal example.
•'The exact number of such deals is tiot reported in Walters's (1989) article.
for which a retailer rationally engages in greater (han 100% pass-through. This subset contains matiy simple, commonly used demand functions, such as the constant elasticity demand function, the negative exponential demand function, and many other varying elasticity demand functions.
Thai the constant elasticity demand function leads to the seemingly surprising outcome of greater than 100% passthrough has been shown for a qtjantity-selling firm by Bulow and Pfleiderer (1983) and also is obvious from the texthook formula for a monopolist's markup: p = c/[I H-(I/£)I, where p is the price, c the marginal cost, and £ the demand elasticity (for example, see Pindyck and Ruhinfeld 1994) . Because e is a constant for the constant elasticity demand function, here, dp/dc = 1/(1 + l/e), which is greater than 1 as E<-1. Biattberg and Neslin (1990, p. 456) calctjiate retailer pass-through for some parameter values of an exponential demand function q = exp(a -p[p + P^^'' where p is the retail price and D the deal amount the retailer gives to consumers. They show how, when ^2 > Pi ('•^•' when deal elasticity is higher ihan price elasticity), a retailer might give a positive amount of a deal to consumers even when it gets zero trade deal from its manufacturer.'* This article adds to this body of research by showing a class of consumer demand junctions for which it is optimal for a price-setting retailer to pass through greater (less) than 100% of the trade deal amount it gets from its upstream manufacturer.
In a related article, Neslin, Powell, and Stone (1995) use the "loss leader" argument to allow the retail pass-through parameter in their optimization model to lake values gre^iei than 100%. This argument suggests that if a retailer receives a price discount on a brand that can play the role of loss leader, the retailer may decrease its price by more than the deal amount, build traffic in its store, and increase its total profit from the store. Although this explanation may be driving the phenomenon in many situations, this article shows (hat the presence of this traffic-btJilding incentive is not necessary for a retailer to pass through more than its deal amount. Even if a retailer was selling only one product, which implies no trafftc building incentive, it still could find il optimal to indulge in greater than 100%' pass-through. Similarly, it is possible that competition at retail level is a force behind the empirical phenomenon of greater than 100% retail pass-through. However, because there is only a single retailer in this model, the results show that retail-level competition is also not necessary for a retailer to have more than 100% pass-through. Even a monopolist retailer may find il optimal to pass through more than 100% of its trade deal amount.
Before moving on to the model, 1 should clarify that by trade deals., I mean temporary price cuts given by manufacturers to retailers with the goal of getting them to give temporary price reductions to consumers, for example, the "offinvoice" and "hill-hack" types of trade deals. (For a description of various other types of trade deals, such as cooperative advertising, display allowances, contests, slotting allowances, and free goods, see Biattberg and Neslin 1990,) THE MODEL Consider a simple setting in which a manufacturer sells a product to a retailer, which then sells it to the consumers. Let tbe consumer demand function be q(p), where p is the retail price set by lhe retailer. The only requirements on q(p) are that it be downward sloping, that is, q'(p) < 0, and thrice continuously differentiable.'' In this section, I assume thai the manufacturer uses a linear pricing policy and sets its price w in its role as a Stackelberg price leader. TTie retailer, in turn, acts as the Stackelberg price follower and sets the retail price p.T he retailer's profit-maximization problem is as follows:
If p* is the optimal solution, the first-and second-order conditions are as follows;
( 1) and (2) (p* -w)q'(p*) = 0,
Differentiating the foe in Equation 1 w.r.t w provides the following:
Rearranged, dp* ^ q'(p*) dw (p* -w)q"ip*) + 2q'(p*) Because q' < 0 by assumption and the denominator in the preceding expression is negative from the soc in Equation 2, dpVdw > 0 (as expected). Using the value of (p* -w) from the foe in Equation I provides the following:(
3) dp* ^q'cp*)
Thus, whether the retailer pass-through is more than., equal to, or less than 100%' depends on whether
However, the retailer's second-order condition also must be satisfied. Using the value of (p* -w) from lhe foe in Equation 1 in the soc in Equation 2 implies the following restriction:
e. the optimal retailer policy is to set price as high as feasible, say p, and then give a huge deal. Mathematically, the following relalionship holds: D* = p -(i/pi) -c + TD, where c is tfie manufacturer price and TD the manufacturer trade deal amount. Although D* may be positive for TD = fJ. <lD*/d(TD) ~ I. which implies thai any change in the amoum of manufacturer trade deal is passed on completely by the retailer to consumers (ie., the optimal equilibrium retail pass-through is 100% for this dematid function).^1 use q' to represent dq/dp, q" to represent d^q/dp-, and so on, The tetnporal sequence of the setting of manufacturer and retailer prices makes the use of a Stackelberg leader-foHower pricing assumption a natural choice.
The corresponding expression in a quantity-setting game is dpVdw = p'(q*)/[2p'(q*) + qp"(q*)] (Bresnahan and Reiss 1985: Bulow and Pfleiderer i9S3>. If w* is tbe optimal solution, tbe firet-and second-order conditions are as follows: (6) and (7) dw = 0, dp* dw Rearranging tbe foe in Equation 6 provides the following: q'(dp*/dw) Because dp*/dw > 0, as was sbown previously, and q' < 0 by assumption, w* > 0 (an interior solution, as expected). The soc in Equation 7 requires imposing some conditions on tbe third-order derivative of the demand function. Specifically, Ihe following is needed:
wbere (p = qq'7(q')-. Tbe construct (p, wbicb plays a central role in the results,^ measures the responsiveness of a firm's marginal revenue to a change in its price. Specifically, the more responsive the marginal revenue to a change in price, tbe lower is the value of tbis construct.Â ssuming that the condition in Equation 8 is satisfied, the conditions in Equations 4 and 5 provide the necessary conditions for retail pass-tbrough to take different values. Specifically, these lead to tbe following main results:
Theorem I: Define 9 = qq"/{q')2 for a given consumer demand function q(p). Then, the retailer pass-through is (a) less than 100% if (p < 1, (b) equal to 100% if tp = 1. and (c) greater than 100% if I < (p < 2.
This theorem shows the conditions on consumer demand functions facing a retailer tbat determine the percentage of retailer pass-tbrougb. Tbe conditions are easy to compute, and anyone familiar with basic calculus can do a back-ofthe-en velope calculation to check the extern of pas^s-through for any given demand function. For example, consider tbe commonly used linear demand function q = a -bp. Here, q' = -b, q" = 0, and hence, 9 = qq"/(q')'^ = 0. Thus, from Theorem 1, tbe linear demand function wouid lead to a less ''A similar construct involving the first-and second-order derivatives of demand function has been shown <o affect key comparative statics results in many other oligopolistic situations (e.g . Bresnahan and Reiss 1985; Dixit l986;Tyagi 1999).
•^1 show subsequently tbat (p = 2 -d([nr)/dp.
tban 100% optimal retail pass-tbrougb of manufacturer trade deals. The intuition behind tbe results in Theorem 1 is simple. A profit-maximizing retailer chooses its price such that its marginal revenue equals its marginal cost. A trade deal reduces the retailer's marginal cost, and therefore, it musl reduce its price to reduce its marginal revenue by the same amount. Then, if the retailer's marginal revenue (mr) is (1) not much responsive to a change in price (i.e., d(mr)/dp < 1), it must reduce its price by more than the amount of its reduction in its marginal cost (leading to greater than 100% pass-through); (2) very responsive to a change in price (i.e., d(mrVdp > I), it musl reduce its price by less tban the amount of its reduction in its marginal cost (leading to less tban 100% pass-tbrough); or (3) responsive to a change m price sucb tbat d(mr)/dp = I, it must reduce its price by exactly tbe amount of its reduction in its marginal cost (leading to 100% pass-through).
To relate this intuition to tbe conditions in Theorem 1, note that the retailer's revenue is pq(p), and its marginal revenue is as follows: mr = Thus, the retailer's marginal revenue changes with its price in tbe following way: (9) d(mr) dp
(J -(p) = 2 -Tben, reducing its marginal revenue by one unit requires the retailer to reduce its price by less tban one unit (i.e., have less tban 100% pass-tbrougb) if d(mr)/dp > I, or from Equation 9, if ip < I. Bui ihis i.s exaLily ibe condition in Tbeorem 1 for less tban 100% retail pass-tbrough. Similarly, reducing its marginal revenue by one unit requires the retailer to reduce its price by more than otie unit (i.e., bave greater tban 100% pass-through) if d(mr)/dp < 1, or from Equation 9, if tp > I. And tbis is exactly the condition in Theorem 1 for greater tban 100% retail pass-tbrougb. I nexl use Theorem J to determine the class of demand functions that leads to greater (less) tban 100% retail passtbrougb. Because q" < 0 for concave demand functions and q" = 0 for the linear demand function, from Theorem I, the retail pass-through always will be less than 100% for tbese demand functions. Tbe only case in which the condition in part (c) of Theorem 1 may be satisfied is wben tbe demand function is convex, namely, when q" > 0. Thus, Corollary liThe retail pass-through is always less than I00' 7f for (he linear demand function and for al! concave demand functions. Corollary 2: The retail pass-through can be greater than 100%
for convex demand functions.
Corollaries 1 and 2 predict that less tban 100% retail passtbrougb sbould occur in many more settings than greater than 100% pass-through, wbicb seems consistent with the empirical findings in marketing literature. Corollary 2 also implies that not all convex demand functions cause greater than 100% retail pass-through. Therefore, next use the con-liition I < <p(p) ^ 2 from Theorem ! to determine a class of convex demand functions tbat lead to greater than !(X)% oplimat retail pass-through. Solving the differential equation arising from this condition.
flO)
qq" -kq'2 = 0, J < k < 2, provides tbe following result (assuming the manufacturer's soc in Equation 8 is satisfied):
Corollary 3: All consumer demand functions of the following form lead to a retailer pass-through of greater than 100%; If (in where Ci and C2 are constants to be eliminated using any initial conditions thai the situation warrants on the consumer demand function q(p), and 1 < k < 2 is the constant from Equation 10.
This corollary can be used to get some specific demand functions that satisfy Equation 11 and therefore lead to greater than 100% retail pass-through. For example, consider the class of demand functions q(p) that cut the p-axis at some poinl p and the q-axis at some point q. In other words, q(p = 0) = q, and 3 p < =0 s.t. q(p > p) -0. Using these conditions to eliminate constants C| and Cj from Equation 11 leads to the following:
which in turn implies that the following class of demand functions satisfies tbe greater tban 100% retail pass-through criterion:
Note that a different set of conditions can be imposed on Equation 11 to eliminate constants C| and CT and obtain different demand functions that lead to greater than 100% pass-through.
Two-Part Manufacturer Pricing
In the previous section, I assumed that the manufacturer uses a linear pricing policy and showed demand conditions thai lead to greater (less) than 100% retail pass-through. Tbe results were in terms of necessary conditions because it had to be assumed that the manufacturer's second-order condition in Equation 8 {in terms of the third-order derivative of the demand function) was satisfied. In this section, I show that if tbe manufacturer uses a two-part pricing policy and charges the retailer a per unit priee and a fixed fee, all the necessary conditions in the results in the previous section aJso become sufficient conditions.
Let the manufacturer's marginal cost be c, its per unit price w, and tbe fixed fee F. The manufacturer's optimal pol-'^'Whereas the condition on cp(p) in Equation 10 is required to be satisfied only at the equilibriuni price, Equation II characterizes the demand tunctions that satisfy this condition everywhere on the demand function. Thus, there can exist demand functions other than those characterized by Equation 11 that also lead to greater than ]00% pass-through-Otie such il-'ustiation i.s provided subsequently.
icy then is to set its price w equal to its marginal cost c to eliminate the problem of double-marginalization and to set its fixed fee F= (p-c)q to extract the whole of the retailer's proftt. This optimal pricing rule is fixed, and there is no separate first-or .second-order proftt-maximization condition for the manufacturer (apart from the retailer's conditions, as shown subsequently).
The retailer's problem is as follows:
Because the manufacturer sets w = c, the retailer's problem becomes
Tbe term for the fixed fee F drops out of the following flrstand second-order conditions for the retailer:
and (13) But tbese are exactly the same conditions as in Equations 1 and 2 in the previous section, which were used to derive ali the results. The only difference now is that there is no need for any separate second-order condition for tbe manufacturer. Tbus, Theorem 2: If the manufacturer uses a two-pan pricing policy, the conditions necessary for the resuUs in Theorem 1 and Corollaries 1 and 2 become both necessary and sufficient.
For example, 1 < (p < 2 now becomes both a necessary and sufficient condition for a greater than 100% retail pass-through.
Examples
I next provide a few specific demand functions that lead to greater than 100% retail pass-througb, assuming a linear pricing policy for the manufacturer. It is clear from the results in the previous section that tbe illustrations also would hold for a two-part manufacturer pricing policy.
Example 1: The negative exponential demand function: q = exp(-p^}. The equilibrium value of (p (in the Stackelberg leader-follower pricing game discu.s.sed in Ihe model .setup) can be checked as = [1 -p + [iQP]Q-li/3, where Q = (1/p + 1/V3)i'li. Thus, the greater than IOO%i retail pass-through criterion in Theorem 1 (1 < 9 < 2) is satisfied for 0 < ^ < 1. along with the manufacturer's second-order condition. Therefore, negative exponential demand functions with parameter 0 < P < 1 yield a retail pass-through of more than 100%." A graphical depiction ofthe pass-througb as a function of parameter P appears in Figure 1 .
Example 2: The varying elasticity detnand function: q ( I + pp. The equilibrium value of <p can be checked as = , and thus, tbe greater than 100% retail pass-"As metitroned m footnote JO, ihis demand Cunciion is nol of the form given in Equation 11. but it meets the greater thati 100% pass-through condition on <p(p) al the equiiibrium price. The constanS elasticity demand function: q = pf'. The equilibrium value of (p can be checked as = (p -I )/p, and thus, the greater than 100% retail pass-through criterion in Theorem 1 is satisfied for P < -1.
EXTENSIONS AND OTHER ISSUES Modeling Manufacturer Price Promotion
ln the model, I did not provide any reason for the change in the price w that the manufacturer charges the retailer There are several reasons a manufacturer might indulge in price promotion. An increase in competitive intensity at the manufacturer level may lead to a reduction in the price a manufacturer charges the retailer, or a change in a manufacturer's own input costs may lead it to reduce its price to the retailer.'-I first model the manufacturer's pricing decision in a monopoly setting. If a monopolist manufacturer's input cost is c, its price w, and its demand function g(w), its profit-maximization problem leads to the following relationship: w* = c -g(w)/g'(w). Thus, any change in manufacturer's input cost c (due to some exogenous reasons; see footnote 12) leads the manufacturer Io change its price w to the retailer.
To model the manufacturer's price change due to competitive reasons, assume that there are n manufacturers selling to the retailer. The simplest model in which competition among these n manufacturers determines the retail price is the Cournot model.'^ Let the inverse demand function for the manufacturers be w = g(Q), where Q = £"= ,qj, and q; is the output of the ith manufacturer. The profit-maximization problem for these manufacturers leads to the following relationship: w* = c -q*g''(Q), where q* is the equilibrium output of each manufacturer and c their common marginal cost. Any temporary drop in c leads the manufacturer price to drop temporarily. Also, because dq*/dn < 0 and g' <: 0 (downward sloping demand function), entry of a new manufacturer, that is, an increase in n, also leads to a reduction in the price w that the retailer pays.'''
Even if this explicit modeling of the manufacturer price decrease decision is included in the main model, the necessary conditions for the results in Theorem 1 still remain valid. For example, the pass-through still will be less than 100% for all concave demand functions and the linear demand function and greater than 100% for only a subset of convex demand functions (those satisfying the 1 < <p(p) < 2 condition).
Difference Between Price Elasticity and Promotion Elasticity
Some empirical research in marketing (for a review and references, see Biattberg and Neslin 1990) has found thai the magnitude of promotion elasticity (deal discount elasticity) is higher than the magnitude of price elasticity (cf Guadagni and Little 1983) . For example, Biattberg and Neslin (1990) report that the deal elasticities on average are more Ehan double the price elasticities in four produci categories-flour, tuna fish, bathroom tissue, and margarine. If these findings are interpreted to mean that the demand curve '-For example, lemporary changes in the financial health of pan suppliers in Malaysia (say. due to cuneni currency crises in pans of Asia) lead to temporary changes in the input costs of U.S. furniture manufacturers, which in turn temporarily drop their prices to U.S. fumitare retail outlets, which leads to large number of price promotions by retail furniture outlets, in coffee markets, temporary changes m weather conditions in Brazil affect the input prices of U.S coffee manufacturers, which in tum leads to temporary changes in coffee manufacturers' prices to retail outlets.
'-'The same results can be shown in a Bertrand setting, ' •"To obtain compararive stalics results in any paniai equilibrium model, there must be an exogenous change in some element of the system. In this case. I have modeled the manufacturer's price change by considering exogenous change in (1) input cost of manufacturer(s) and (2) degree of competition among the manufacturers. The articles cited previously as providing empirical evidence of greater than 100% retail pass-through do not report the reasons the manufacturers gave trade deals to retailers. Thus, it is unclear whether the potential reasons modeled here for manufacturer trade promotions apply to the empirical examples previously discussed.
is actually q(p, d), instead of q(p -d) as is used here, then how do the results change? The condition for greater (less) than 100% pass-through explained in tbe previous section will remain tbe same: Tbe retailer's marginal revenue should decrease by less (more) than one unit for each unit increase in the deal amount d. The only difference is in tbe decision variable tbrougb whicb the retailer changes its marginal revenue. Whereas it changed p in the setup in the main model, it would change d in this modified setup. Specifically, consider the case in wbich tbe retailer receives a trade deal when the system is in equilibrium (i.e., tbe equilibrium retail price p* is as defined hy Equations 1 and 2) and must decide the amount of consumer deal d. Tbe retailer determines tbe optimal size of consumer deal d by equating its marginal revenue to its cbanged marginal cost. Here, the retailer's revenue is where all the expressions are evaluated at p = p*, as defined hy Equations I and 2. Then, whenever tbis expression is less (more) tban unity, tbe optimal consumer deal amount is greater (smaller) tban tbe trade deal amount and there is greater (less) than 100% retailer pass-through.
Is the Construct of Price Elasticity Sufficient to Determine Degree of Pass-Through?
Price elasticity is undoubtedly tbe most commonly used and reported demand-related construct in empirical work, ll is therefore useful to know if the results can be given in terms of price elasticity of demand functions alone. For example, is it possible to determine whether bigb/low price elasticities are related to more than/equal to/less tban 100% retail pass-through? Because price elasticity (q'[p]p/q[p]) puts no restriction on tbe second-order derivative q"(p), which, from Theorems 1 and 2. is involved in determining the degree of pass-through, price elasticity alone cannot be used to classify tbe degree of retail pass-tbrougb. For example, from Corollary 1, tbe pass-tbrougb never can be greater than 100% for a linear or a concave demand function, irrespective of tbe magnitude of its price elasticity.
Tbus, the absence of tbe second-order derivative q"(p) in (he construct of price elasticity means i! bas less "information" tban tbe construct (p = q(p)q"(p)/[q'(p)]-^ sbown here 10 determine whether a product will have an optimal greater (less) tban 100% pass-through. To understand tbe difference between tbe two constructs, notice that, whereas the construct of price elasticity relates change in price to cbange in demand, tbe construct <p relates change in price to change in marginal revenue.
Does a Product with Optimal Greater than 100% PassThrough Also Make a Good Loss Leader?
Prior literature has sbown several determinants of tbe choice of a product as a loss leader. Eor example, La! and Matutes (1994) show in a two-product model that the product with tbe lower reservation price is a better choice for a loss leader. Products that are frequently purchased and tbat cannot be stockpiled by consumers also are desirable loss leaders (La! and Matutes 1994; Nagle 1987; Walters and Rinne 1986) . Therefore, it is useful to know if a product meeting the greater than 100% pass-through criterion sbown here also makes a more appropriate loss leader.'B ecause tbe main purpose of a loss leader is to generate store traffic, tbe desirability of a product as a loss leader depends on how many people it can bring to tbe store. This in turn is a function of how responsive the product demand is to a decrease in product price, not how responsive tbe product marginal revenue is to a decrease in product price (tbe construct that determines the degree of pass-through). Thus, knowing that a product is suitable to receive greater than 100% pass-through indicates nothing about its suitability as a good loss leader. It is possible that a product that does not meet tbe greater tban 100% pass-tbrough criterion (e.g., a product with concave demand function) is a good candidate for a loss leader to generate store traffic.
Empirical Plausibility of the Conditions for Greater than J00% Pass-Through f / < (p < 2J
The results show tbat, absent otber incentives sucb as traffic building, greater than 100% pass-tbrough can arise only for a subset of convex demand functions, specifically, when I < <p < 2. I present some evidence to sbow tbe empirical plausibility of tbis condition. Boiton (1989) compares the fit of linear, Iog-!og, and semi-!og demand functions on data from many stores for the frozen waffle, liquid bleach, toilet tissue, and ketchup categories and finds the log-log demand function to be the best in approximately one-third of all cases. Because the log-log demand function satisfies tbe I < (p<2 condition,'^ tbe condition for greater than 100% passthrough probably is met in at least some cases. In addition, the following empirical studies also employ tbe log-log demand function: Stout (1969) for several food categories; Urban (1969) for four undisclosed consumer nondurable products; Montgomery and Rossi (1998) for tbe orange juice category; and Hoch and colleagues (1995) for a large number of categories such as soft drinks, canned soup, frozen entrees, dairy cheese, cereal, laundry detergent, toothpaste, fabric softener, and paper towels. Similarly, Armstrong (1991), wbo reports greater than 100% retail pass-through for tbe disposable diaper, ground caffeinated coffee, toilet tissue, and canned tuna categories, also uses tbe log-log demand function. Altbough tbese studies (except for Boiton 1989) do not test whether the log-log demand function is the best fitting demand function for tbeir data, tbe extensive empirical use of (his demand function by so many researcbers use qp to denote dq(p. d)/3p, cjj to represem dq(p, d)/5d. q^j to represent d^(p, dVdpdd. and so on.
"'In a sUicl sense, loss Jeadership means selling a brand at less than ils marginal cost. However, similarlo Nesiin. Powell, and Stone (1W5). I use the lertn to denote a temporary price decrease (noi necessarily less than marginal cost) to bring in store traffic.
I'Log-log demand function is q = apl^, p < 0, Here, q'tp) = a^pP -'. q"(p) = aP(p -I )pl^' ^. and cp = (-1 -t-pVp. Because own price elasticity p < -I, the I < (p < 2 condition is satisfied.
